RTF malware analysis — malicious · 66da09f6742cf21d

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.1 KB

MD5: deb5aa8655bc71b6c4e23b82fd44f067 SHA-1: b7a86a13796bc7055ba43e88c31aaea9f3c5211a SHA-256: 66da09f6742cf21d468ca0e13a24015d0eb08c4e8cc05678ff70bc97166ed279

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The heuristics indicate that \objupdate forces OLE activation, which is a common technique for exploiting this vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution. The embedded OLE object likely serves as a dropper for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000928.bin` `d5f145892f88c29b40c1e784d3791a05e1e4baa78e754cd01184dbcf925abe99`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x928	1859 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.