Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66d8d9ebe26f12e4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

37.5 KB Created: 1601-01-01 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 619a82fc5a4e879fe83d3bf817b720db SHA-1: 1af7bc42a7ce2127bbb8707eec4079ffd32807bc SHA-256: 66d8d9ebe26f12e4d64bf1b0b13d8cc796b4bd191383f588e93476a59150566a
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits critical static triage findings related to embedded Office documents and legacy WordBasic macro virus markers, suggesting malicious intent. The presence of 'ToolsMacro' and 'AutoOpen' in the document body further supports the likelihood of macro execution. The OLE structure anomalies indicate potential obfuscation or corruption designed to evade analysis.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Showoff-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Showoff-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 19,824 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 19,824 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00004890.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x4890 19824 bytes
SHA-256: 65ea3b8b67afc7ea8477a80b2850aef24c114e4b22b1821c84a17c1f8b6a9a43

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