Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66d1213d4c6a4003…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.8 KB Created: 2020-09-01 20:49:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d5ef183b8d4d35f3ee803204874d83fa SHA-1: 07ac0146854002cc66cb25330f29b2b0a91a6938 SHA-256: 66d1213d4c6a4003d88393636b0e3c3a54853ff70a5df7271412eb3d4610ddbb
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, which is also present in the document body. The presence of a 'download button' lure and a 'password-protected archive' lure suggests the document is designed to trick users into clicking the malicious link, likely to download a second-stage payload or redirect to a phishing site. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=appserv-+win32-+2.+5.+9+free
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/9040/1685/files/lawafaxisikuma.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6265/6166/files/carpenter_s_blocks_mod_mcpe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9853/8151/files/free_vin_check_vehicle_history_report.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3934/2248/files/kitab_barzanji_download.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6558/1468/files/japji_sahib_path.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0457/6270/7620/files/aluminium_phosphide_poisoning.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2865/1938/files/rixopipa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3191/0821/files/xivamivupex.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_79205009721042c7a088d05b4efaf80a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_66628c131d9b48abb03ec98d06b2095a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3de8a6_8b37af6da286478e8815e167cbcbb097.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_86e99511f69c406393a8b64b56dfe739.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/277b62_7d7ed3be82724087874003b60ac273c2.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006ddf.bin
80960c5ef920dc812f40421d0c41ad5272b60f71c1256c1bdf7a11afd8d5b2df		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6DDF 2880 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000781c.bin
04b64cb2213a9b05199720650f0218430a246a2d50ae57995b0bfcb632475b65		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x781C 5436 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00008acf.bin
79577c00ba550943a293dd3c693cd74590871135b79837f46e5a87cd3393ddec		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8ACF 11636 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000b0e8.bin
79d002990b11908b2686f6551f03fd1da74af0900ad04a6ffb25e1bc81888bfd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB0E8 16148 bytes

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