Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66cee726accdaaa5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.2 KB Created: 2020-06-04 02:57:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7fc39d3bb7bda2c5ac13c75337f88f9f SHA-1: 17de70f245d1b7555b835e3d857d1d5eb3daaad8 SHA-256: 66cee726accdaaa57c1eddf7d28fd1dcf542208c3efdf29dfa68c87e9ddeba79
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to similarly structured URLs on various domains. The heuristic 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' indicates a mass external link farm, suggesting a coordinated effort to direct users to potentially malicious content. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the ML classifier's high confidence score point towards a malicious intent, likely related to phishing or redirecting users to malware. The document body contains a reference to 'Verizon jetpack mifi 4620l', which may be a lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://debtordata.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857304/131857304.html#verizon+jetpack+mifi+4620l
    • http://prbycr.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379830/matodapen.pdf
    • http://root.harvestfoods.ca/uploads/1/3/0/5/130589288/wopomirasagop-toxazikilel.pdf
    • http://allstarcreditrepair.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774965/4239100.pdf
    • http://integritygutter.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130488412/vexevokogarisis.pdf
    • http://webmail.northidahocasa.org/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551210/bipetofesasezodav.pdf
    • http://unlvtakebackthetap.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739452/sazukad.pdf
    • http://ultimatepantrysystems.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130540789/2145065.pdf
    • http://74-123-73-182.mgwnet.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398139/wuzojugepirip-rolewefoju-kitemilusutop-tagaxekofakula.pdf
    • http://koininjas.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856133/jikidijibo.pdf
    • http://mjlplumbing.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323666/xebidu_kafaziwu.pdf
    • http://padiacademysg.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130540683/ac9ef2.pdf
    • http://ehmhomeloans.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636676/9a5739d4b554.pdf
    • http://debtordata.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857304/terms.html
    • http://debtordata.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857304/dmca.html
    • http://debtordata.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857304/policy.html
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://koxifolaligu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/133631365.pdf
    • https://wimitakilo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vegowibizomipuzoxovuf.pdf
    • https://besodapix.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xiwudogikivilisa.pdf
    • https://zarenorazer.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sifokutevizaxusa.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000064c2.bin
7fc1188ab0b24f2c01fa859473f2f52b68462470b4ff87ea7945209f12beaa96
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x64C2 10560 bytes