Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 668a0aa35da7256e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.3 KB Created: 2021-09-06 13:28:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: f9f05f194e36f17e1daded15186d1a38 SHA-1: 2a43bea66597c333bdad30ed9f898e596f239ea1 SHA-256: 668a0aa35da7256eb229ea790c05e143e5dfa2ed1b5606a1ac6089acaa8c2736
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains multiple links to external resources, many hosted on compromised websites, suggesting it's part of a phishing or malware distribution campaign. The heuristics indicate a lure for browser extension installation and a password-protected archive, which are common social engineering tactics to bypass security measures and deliver malicious payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://carcarnet.com/home/sandbox/domains/hkdance.tritek.hk/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/69825193707.pdf
    • https://pensiunea-escape.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/76598810489.pdf
    • http://www.trimbleexpress.sk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a53416d4c98---10161599530.pdf
    • http://ambulatorioveterinariocigliano.com/userfiles/files/36103579857.pdf
    • http://boulderdivorcelaw.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a07036c1666---26543225590.pdf
    • http://fra2ange.it/userfiles/files/mibinesenununukufokili.pdf
    • http://footstepfloor.com/upfiles/files/1601266041.pdf
    • http://tienhasteel.com/app/webroot/upload/files/64326726459.pdf
    • https://kurashi-kyoiku.com/cms/dat/upimg/file/gawapukafanibasotu.pdf
    • http://www.sempresaude.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a783fa5c3a6---35145268813.pdf
    • http://aromacosmetics.bg/assets/userfiles/file/jamejetamezebigelupijot.pdf
    • https://smarttactic.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a51e12b78aa---febasogenenadukun.pdf
    • http://www.lbf-cosmetics.com/website/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fb241b69b6c---vetiwufuzewop.pdf
    • https://aquariumfargo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/735fb75dd9fb6bfdeccfe47b43be9e28/75933502179.pdf
    • http://www.corazondelsol.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wevid.pdf
    • http://keletunderground.hu/images/uploaded_pics/file/4030256481.pdf
    • https://ascinfratech.com/clientprojects/trading/file/xiwam.pdf
    • https://jechrina.gr/FCKeditor/userimages/file/jodibilasebipufavas.pdf
    • http://christembassydocklands.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/efeb87c8b74cbe713bd99f310bd81fc4/kipilufipowapodapibetal.pdf
    • https://scavilecis.it/userfiles/file/taweduzutukez.pdf
    • http://juniorsmagazine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ed4f77cc63---pajabetepebujo.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/zMnd8XtcwSM/uplcv?utm_term=como+unir+pdf+con+foxit+phantompdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e27d.bin
83b76daa35e92db5ad2e9c6471dc0f81ccf1cf89194dea58523f0a44bdc430cd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE27D 10772 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb15.bin
89e004810af9ca3ec9108677361e1eeea18501166be4c52bb6f588eddcd2f42a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB15 20012 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012fa6.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12FA6 16792 bytes