Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 667bac466ed428c5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2021-02-13 20:26:25 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: e560842aa1030b4a9494f7b1260918c7 SHA-1: e9f32f01c51a836e752e2e108680b2cecef1c561 SHA-256: 667bac466ed428c5a22b6ecb1062ff1a7d8e0931c4ba978a0f08b3c6c756f299
146 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple external URIs, including one that appears to be a download lure for a file named 'download to pimp a butterfly zip'. The heuristic 'SE_CALLBACK_LURE' further suggests a phishing or tech-support scam context. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for delivering a secondary payload via the embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/123?utm_term=download+to+pimp+a+butterfly+zip PDF link annotation
    • http://tevojagi.iblogger.org/spotify_ios_9._3._5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bolegabafewibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134651697/kuzuvex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://monisobagarov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856119/6165330.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://subutadenurafo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134581349/2866b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4493553/normal_5fe30458b890f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pexulabin.iblogger.org/zaduzofev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lighttravel-ng.com/hunters_and_props_unblocked_gamesm4sqw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://masito.space/46817277711ilf5z.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gojafone.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134891791/f644b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dozuga/benitaxat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xezonijida/happy_birthday_cake_gif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://guruwemuzotal.epizy.com/8085_microprocessor_multiple_choice_questions_answer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/votuweroxigezog/quiqup_app_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vewomani.rf.gd/nekunopikawurixal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d888.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD888 5392 bytes
SHA-256: c34b7f28ceb0f6296c2e1a7ee47898e8497b31eca106daae9bd8811321aa8fd7
font_01_sfnt_off0000eaf0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAF0 11448 bytes
SHA-256: 0921126f72a189c2464fd7be7f7b1ab8ef584c2177a4f119f4b9e31a5de68324

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