Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 667165b2dd0be5e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: f9e780d8c37b55a8920ba24ceecc9378 SHA-1: 8ab0fc925f1e1eb2e3557b5a644529be576e485a SHA-256: 667165b2dd0be5e1d2976a91117a36c873203f0e220ea9f99413fbc4c69503a9
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for client-side code execution. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d1.bin
5222320575d2d1dd41a80bd8f472c83aebe220ece10d763203f1c5f56aac137e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD1 1849 bytes

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