Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 666bedc871f5ff01…

MALICIOUS

PDF

159.7 KB
MD5: c42200d8cf6104482231057cc53f4a5d SHA-1: a2858f004eef8d95720a0abb04865fa0e5215bf7 SHA-256: 666bedc871f5ff01dbf60e7487b84a41bcc0cdfa83eb0a480c76bd4ee5525ea0
450 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits multiple known Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, including CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, and CVE-2008-2992. The script is designed to download a second-stage payload from one of the provided URLs. The presence of shellcode and a download URL strongly indicates a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://splo.in/x/p.php?e=6&&
    • http://splo.in/x/p.php?e=5&&
    • http://splo.in/x/p.php?e=7&&

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0008_000.js
659dc174f2bd57e352f326df1a6e978e90edb6d08532008a405da28242a41587
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 8 at offset 0x1E7 2462 bytes
javascript_obj0008_001.js
dcdac108d9071ddf0ea931a62990e31c3bfffcc5571688f0de368648c2178e93
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 8 at offset 0x209 163043 bytes
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
c84bb2202f81c968559e0c591b98da8e3d1be0f4496596183c4b2ee169bd7bfe
deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0xBB9 4452 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).