Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 66585050a9f7c9ad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.6 KB Created: 2021-04-01 00:54:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 5956194175518a660535f11fe934d417 SHA-1: f141373fb1eb31edc5ae70502d7acc543d23496e SHA-256: 66585050a9f7c9adb1fd2c3d07f6fb6f7d4bb06a5dd18a7884c7e75f45e8e280
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, suggesting a link farm or redirection scheme. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of embedded URIs and the ML classifier's high confidence indicate malicious intent, likely to direct users to potentially harmful content or phishing sites. The primary attack pattern involves leveraging a large number of external links within the document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kuzutuzo.ru/strik?utm_term=baby+girl+names+2018+unique+spanish
    • https://jerupixudenaxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437293/jenuzufeluj_fotewabaz.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388060/normal_60385d9193c34.pdf
    • https://vigobekopu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302998/mamajizuje.pdf
    • http://misstourist.info/44172733071t3zzi.pdf
    • http://goldstein.capital/oriental_adventures_3.5kx2ae.pdf
    • http://5coupons.info/rawixozoluzosnjhd8.pdf
    • http://hookup682.site/6279568228l95ul.pdf
    • http://molebikoxudadow.iblogger.org/what_is_main_religion_in_china.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489240/normal_60552968d79a2.pdf
    • https://xutareziwax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327408/16841.pdf
    • https://biwasigefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398444/getodo-vewanemimapo.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420448/normal_60462e5a81aeb.pdf
    • https://jebilazi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856389/9930335.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fixararololu/how_long_does_it_take_to_learn_ios_development.pdf
    • http://ramimofisodufos.epizy.com/o_que__o_liberalismo.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vifusupegiza/shark_rotator_powered_lift-away_2-in-1_canister_vacuum_cleaner.pdf
    • https://9e77dbea-16d6-438e-9859-4a68c5388828.filesusr.com/ugd/3225da_d90d84394e9e4b29a1015b4d7dc6f03c.pdf?index=true
    • https://c6de0af5-2a4c-46da-924c-839bccb102c6.filesusr.com/ugd/5f1f0f_67d9b5ea671f47b9a81aef33cc9a8919.pdf?index=true
    • http://xuvelenidoxi.rf.gd/83558287193.pdf
    • https://80c93ba6-74df-4afb-9852-3a83eaba20e3.filesusr.com/ugd/4cf28d_a917eb14b35c4c5baf9f1aec619fe786.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e6e3.bin
e32db1f1debdaa9d7b190220e01977ad74dc3389feba925f86275a9ba741c7ad
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6E3 6168 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fbbb.bin
bde9399c4214af19ff907e4e2ed79d840dc769fe23e160fe83159b0cc81fff3c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFBBB 11048 bytes