PDF malware analysis — malicious · 66511fd11316b4e3

MALICIOUS

PDF

8.3 KB

MD5: 75cf27912a84027deb07dedaf4dd6e2c SHA-1: 079753b5804e33b3528f141fe9bc9700fd1ae79e SHA-256: 66511fd11316b4e374ecbca44a388eab70270c2c40e074067982b28811ebf06b

458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript designed to exploit CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script attempts to download a second-stage payload from the URL http://googleinrus.in/cgi-bin/plt/z002106201r0019Rdc1fb491Xd1560143Y39bad4c5Z0100f060. The presence of anti-analysis checks and the multi-stage nature of the dropper indicate a malicious intent to execute arbitrary code.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 13

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE

PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086
ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV

ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE

unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER

PDF JavaScript shows 3 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL

Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://googleinrus.in/cgi-bin/plt/z002106201r0019Rdc1fb491Xd1560143Y39bad4c5Z0100f060

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0006_000.js` `f9b4659beaf681d266cfb5046d495e7b144d406eff72e71ecd4d1451ae25ca11`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x143	481 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js` `e98fdf184b93cded0a5d0c6584e65db96918c0b3682ec4a033528fafa9a28a58`	deobfuscated-js	repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1BBF	1896 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`legacy_pdfkit_stage_001.js` `505eb809839bed3231e38271498c8c2dd3a85f3e901e369659dec6cbf60c7549`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x329	5144 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `e18febc1e43c5947bb1f047c3c30a174f7139b8ece04c1a50fc47ede35c792eb`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	48178 bytes
Detection ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086 Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).

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