Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 663f695277a894bd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

87.4 KB
MD5: 38f791dbf6e64dd4ec64edcf5c1965df SHA-1: b6df7ec4e6d414924d946fec0a75e76d0a701484 SHA-256: 663f695277a894bd3407d01f6693431d0bad324d21501a653c5a7ebc71ff3ec2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive forces OLE object activation, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability. This exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, although the specific nature of that payload cannot be determined from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e67.bin
ab2bf71a8ec004533b39fa5b2accd74918c3f2925f0dc31c09f6e5a555305227
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E67 1757 bytes