Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6620608a87823a7d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

96.9 KB Created: 2020-12-27 15:23:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: bf0a9e8b648b0e3cf6b7316d40af63b2 SHA-1: 6d0bd2d1acd2637f3ee24534cae3d8c5ecbc7273 SHA-256: 6620608a87823a7da1b9640a192a19f5bec8f5794321e383f815e2fb31255250
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1071.001 Web Protocols: Web Protocols

The sample contains VBA macros that trigger on document open. These macros instantiate the WScript.Shell COM object to download a file named 'svchost.exe' from the URL 'http://bitbuck.org/cryptxxx/files/downloads/svchost.exe'. The script then proceeds to execute the downloaded file, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA instantiates a dangerous COM class by CLSID critical OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_DANGEROUS
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate an execution/scripting-capable COM class by its raw CLSID, avoiding the CreateObject ProgID that name-based detection keys on.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
16d2dd78ea11fc5ba5861efc404302246e315c67eea64d7947a61a1519562983		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9326 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
6a1441af367b8728a0557d0343fd0708c9920827ac21874337e84a99dd086c45		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 32256 bytes

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