Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6612999935d00c0a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

419.8 KB Created: 2021-09-05 22:27:00 First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 056c1235af431ef3075a63923557a8dc SHA-1: 9ce4c2606e2d166c2d358d51a8b65ed3160781af SHA-256: 6612999935d00c0ad1c9412f81176940a7ad2d8b029aaa1866f1141ee6ca6261
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting OLE object vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-8570, which are known to facilitate the execution of remote code. The heuristics indicate that the OLE object is automatically linked and updated, forcing activation and loading of a second-stage payload from the OLE moniker stream. This payload is likely contained within the extracted objdata files.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00014547.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14547 75541 bytes
SHA-256: 0f5a116cc1dbb05f8aacb1b316f4fd26280683f8d0d29d15328702642fdf7ced
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_01_off0003abac.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3ABAC 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
objdata_02_off0003c14f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3C14F 12297 bytes
SHA-256: 44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037