Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 661156554c52c188…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.3 KB Created: 2020-10-05 01:48:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: a4d61375f2aacca25a3ce130e4a53960 SHA-1: d464fa2f8246316f7646e6f699dd73b83201451e SHA-256: 661156554c52c1880416434cd73f1afa729425d21a5f47d3f4b77f7a53db1226
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains multiple embedded links that redirect to a malicious URL, likely intended to lead the user to malicious content or phishing pages. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of a known malicious redirector URL reinforces this assessment. The document body itself contains obfuscated text and URLs, suggesting an attempt to disguise its malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=danielle+cohn+porn In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037869.mozfiles.com/files/1037869/fonavewezalafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043215.mozfiles.com/files/1043215/fuvorus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1045368.mozfiles.com/files/1045368/51646728249.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038690.mozfiles.com/files/1038690/bulipalizat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038759.mozfiles.com/files/1038759/bujoloxitejagavakazinugop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.healthgeography.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453251/fisemosomuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://salasax.lancernation.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738591/defarutebusadobuxud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.backcountryclassroom.net/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070351/dakaxudezebeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lawogur.kinderleague.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302966/jovosuwexad_luvut_rogewapifixoxe_toxigidemaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lynchburgkarate.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739490/xagolapu-xuxedumudepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nodamuzas.emiscolorshoot.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437359/mupafibu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dc28b8a8-8089-4114-beaa-2857a7e56bd8/8461970334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d3a2b4b6-0ba6-40bf-9b8d-8a7c9c538e24/31825521148.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f715ed38-5256-41f0-9c2c-99757016d6c0/41759296450.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d268811f-924d-449f-8a14-e67e468440c4/31199456581.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b99.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B99 4548 bytes
SHA-256: bea45b8be7ace6a038e9ea0740476f2682f1a6dc1268083acc4a65a6a690527e
font_01_sfnt_off00007aeb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7AEB 10316 bytes
SHA-256: 9991b6de56e676699d9bd29a1f84494933940034cbb768487086d5381993731c
font_02_sfnt_off00009e51.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9E51 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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