Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6607f57428581dfa…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 179ceadc4a4a30d2666e4c3a7ec6bd98 SHA-1: 4eedcbb4af2fa16ac1c6e649dc05b917e52add56 SHA-256: 6607f57428581dfa6d570080b7b5618bb0765dac08c59740199ca24c58a0a2d3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a client-side vulnerability for code execution, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a3.bin
89e9ef539af3fc71a2d4010caf580372eb9301e25adb6f6f66fa4dc8ca5245c9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA3 1674 bytes