Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6606c2341a411d50…

MALICIOUS

PDF

236.5 KB Created: 2010-07-19 14:51:54 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 8.1 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 8.1.0 (Windows))
MD5: a666d5250c9933a827043bc79fffb69e SHA-1: b3f614fece711ede0e898de5be05cced683121fd SHA-256: 6606c2341a411d50831df7c1cbe6d23209ec6e9ea491b6dfd0152ed6ddb58d08
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This command is used to export an embedded file named 'ADMPlugin.apl', which is identified as a Windows executable payload by ClamAV (Win.Trojan.Protux-103). The ML classifier and multiple critical heuristics strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cMd.ExE critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "%USERPROFILE%\\����\\ADMPlugin.apl" (cd/D "%USERPROFILE%\\����"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ADMPlugin.apl
a6ac1ea9073c97b2454e722b8d447d280c1def68df26f4ad31a58cbf997773d5		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 108 at offset 0x2B6D3 80384 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Protux-103
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0109_000.js
4e8f9ed5cd2b3deb670d441535eac258a2d0e54f0c2cb57b70166520eb5b6d48		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 109 at offset 0x3AB63 60 bytes
icc_00_off00023bb0.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x23BB0 3144 bytes

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