Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 65d9bd8b4fb91141…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

777.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-27
MD5: d707132c6cc01d79201b1da98094f1ad SHA-1: 0bc304a89b59c20c0c935216a5f1fd2e9e463476 SHA-256: 65d9bd8b4fb911418964d7017ce91e4a38cd081a7d91455676859baa8924488b
134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the OLE file attempts to load a remote document from the URL http://93.183.72.7/IUCC/IUSSCCCIUSSCCIUSSCC%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23IUSSCCIUSSCCIUSSCC%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23IUSSCCIUSSC.DOC. Although no VBA code was extracted, the presence of embedded PDF objects with suspicious static findings suggests a multi-stage attack. The primary goal appears to be the execution of a remote payload via the identified vulnerability.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://93.183.72.7/IUCC/IUSSCCCIUSSCCIUSSCC%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23IUSSCCIUSSCCIUSSCC%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23IUSSCCIUSSC.DOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
5be5c89cdc79985cf22467b51d6a5e14b7ff8a03b7077bc9c34ddd47221b92a6
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 791552 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006c00.pdf
cc3b53d8c9023aac34e6e4cf60259b8b4f876c6093343422cbccf8b9cd03c8cd
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6C00 768000 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000c200.pdf
7c56b91e3872ed04b820c3cfa11bc7e87f2f0d648bdf20e8302f0f9aff014675
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xC200 745984 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001c200.pdf
c4d3431876eb9d9712ff3eeca7e945067851188a0a7322477bbfdd9b4f35a24e
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1C200 680448 bytes