MALICIOUS
362
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
The sample contains heavily obfuscated VBA macros, including a Workbook_Open auto-execution loader. This loader is designed to reconstruct and download payloads from a list of 11 embedded URLs. The presence of Wscript.Shell and CreateObject calls, along with the ClamAV signature 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0', strongly indicates Emotet downloader activity.
Heuristics 9
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Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
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URL reconstructed from VBA cell-staged base64 dropper (11 URLs) critical OLE_VBA_CELL_DROPPER_URLVBA reads worksheet cells, strips junk substrings via Replace(), and base64/UTF-16 decodes the result into a PowerShell EncodedCommand payload. The download URL is never contiguous in the file bytes; it was recovered by removing the macro's Replace() junk tokens from the cell strings and decoding the staged base64.
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02220-9938909-0
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Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPTReference to Windows Script Host
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Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://harperhouseproducts.com/Merchant2/ARsf1LIcOauhH1rDrIh/
- http://holubvideo.com/eln-images/zqqgZ0YXaPiWbF/
- http://chastongroditski.com/eln-images/skSsC
- http://seacupps.com/eln-images/AYvykzg/
- http://ericandrobin.com/cgi/qRe8dRaG2HDNOOG1/
- http://sosantiques.com/cgi/9ii/
- https://greenlawnirrigation.net/GLI_New/JRlt3mOiezE/
- https://on-lineventures.com/cgi/ks0Mp/
- http://blog.logo123.com/wp-content/19G04LjA1UcE1tN8/
- http://magicblog.tatamotors.com/wp-includes/7faN9/
- http://intrablog.tatamotors.com/wp-includes/MGGi5zcZrkolFH9/
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basde7bcbc45ff0a77d05d9af662bacc316e71be11a980e94f6673e556a5dd9d1bc |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 12808 bytes |
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