Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 65c0e15c1b8a3c47…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.3 KB
MD5: d9b99daa5b8f7876576da1fbfd783e2c SHA-1: 3ac1879dc7577771a543e3a8d2975cb19ad57833 SHA-256: 65c0e15c1b8a3c4777ad9dcbb37375bd8ea66ffc7cec05f918650f0e7741d12d
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics for a vulnerable Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate suggests an attempt to force OLE activation, which is a common method for exploiting this vulnerability to achieve code execution. The attack pattern is likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000012a6.bin
78f468f2a1638c02b35e9e11af43a01211793ee703e98b3f92db555ab0b9be90
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x12A6 1738 bytes