Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6599945cac85d058…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.7 KB Created: 2021-09-18 02:13:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 2fa3fee91afc20d09514d7e26c64ce9a SHA-1: cb8d32449de8f6dcbb0918e0375e47cb88b7beb7 SHA-256: 6599945cac85d058185d933abe75bb5b982e00ffc9126a01d2e1e4f940e4156a
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised WordPress sites or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and the presence of multiple compromised CMS upload links suggests an attempt to host or distribute further malicious files. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure points to a malicious distribution vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://fablab808.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/xedisakovakunam.pdf
    • http://perfect-aerosol.eu/userfiles/file/29457297503.pdf
    • http://xn--80age2amlc.xn--80adxhks/pics/images/file/96990893781.pdf
    • https://mangallagn.com/images/file/liganiwufufupedor.pdf
    • https://gift-edu.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/eff6f56a13353abae70b96943e71d7cd/60778393600.pdf
    • http://maximaviajes.com/FCKfiles/file/laroboleninajoz.pdf
    • http://energo-winstal.pl/userfiles/file/jularokamub.pdf
    • http://thm-holding.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/22f3da9bd40ebc0e30de76d7d6f5ecc0/gokarixedegemizoxegaza.pdf
    • https://cepatdaftargroup2.com/contents/files/15434883347.pdf
    • http://sapientgenerator.ru/files/userfiles/files/29390313218.pdf
    • https://bbu.vn/Images_upload/files/20838490134.pdf
    • http://www.tobywells.org/media/fckdir/file/xaxagukanugeku.pdf
    • http://dautuck.com/uploads/userfiles/file/1895648450.pdf
    • http://gardatrans.com/content/Files/76552222787.pdf
    • https://www.ibyservice.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e14a975c627b323e279e282d92918078/butepipiwabijaribawug.pdf
    • http://livestreaming.group/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3m6frlsba91kim6t8cs14qbssv7pb7a2/fujaseru.pdf
    • http://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16131839da57b6---bamukozo.pdf
    • http://xutricolor.com/uploadfile/files/nanugegup.pdf
    • http://karmakonnect.org/DrumiBhatt/karmakonnect.org/Final/ckeditorimage/files/sifetokafoxaxukewaforub.pdf
    • http://www.linkkorea.co.kr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161300538469b9---27258208519.pdf
    • http://studioprogettoarchitettura.eu/userfiles/files/78857061743.pdf
    • http://inventory-acepipe.com/images/uploads/files/2801186060.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=x+vpn+free+download+for+android
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bc16.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBC16 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d42d.bin
92532538a36f0ed5e14721d175996a02c0af08aa1b927fe5c073eccae4202eb7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD42D 10384 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ebbe.bin
567cdefa47440f454f160c6681f158eb67600baa3905d6493bd76b750cfd29a4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEBBE 17484 bytes