RTF malware analysis — malicious · 6580a9592020f97c

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.0 KB First seen: 2022-11-17

MD5: 05c1b020ba3b462b0176517ba16b4e18 SHA-1: 7851235b1edfeee1a077c1d034d8f6e90f6dc7e6 SHA-256: 6580a9592020f97cfcb114a99b3ada9bb7e4320af463226c1de4a30628be1736

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by an \objupdate directive. This strongly suggests exploitation of a known Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common tactic for macro-based or exploit-based document attacks.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000552b.bin` `0b58535427e90b3aca58391aefc4b03067ce0c6dc81f5c16844b517054346f5b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x552B	1743 bytes

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