Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 65768da8576274ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 0e14ce244694767b1ddd34323cbf85ec SHA-1: c72b71f958a430de60964abaf80e68c600e6f35e SHA-256: 65768da8576274ef64cd3586ce475a890db13da14b05da3e6792498737c54faf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document, likely as a precursor to downloading a secondary payload. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further indicates the exploitation of embedded object functionality.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000085.bin
7df34d62c9634b0db54289ee29e06e18e171984f512d65ebcdb2cfb0902aa322
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85 1694 bytes