Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 656b8639cc5397ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

20.5 KB First seen: 2023-03-15
MD5: 370d0dcb7cb8eb79008b551c9d66206c SHA-1: 0eeb3530ea1ed19fd1f07ca51a381b79fa377726 SHA-256: 656b8639cc5397ef406cbb2c4d5e3cc9cb7076c8be5e18993aab465628355e09
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID and an objupdate directive, strongly indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a "lure" instructing the user to "Enable editing", which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger the exploit. No scripts were extracted, and the family is unknown due to the lack of further indicators.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003591.bin
c40abfde4f928726a19f0c5e52b35346608766ed872664577ee05d5dde26c390
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3591 1613 bytes