Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 655cf9cc84285a05…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

156.0 KB Created: 2020-12-14 16:04:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: f077a55564f8eaf64ae610d1ef5d2382 SHA-1: 6b90cde38009f9de581c81ffdc77df0c2af05ffd SHA-256: 655cf9cc84285a05fa766502f29bfe0d3a00bc0e6362ec04da5465567c5218d8
144 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and exhibits high-severity heuristics related to Windows Script Host and VBA auto-execution. Although VBA macros could not be extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the detection signature suggest the document is designed to lure the user into downloading and executing a second-stage payload from one of the listed URLs.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.ChristmasGift-9845923-0
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (AssertionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://richardsilk.com/wp-content/plugins/updraftplus/images/addons-images/Zk8Iv9hirxx0i.php
    • https://monacofieldson.co.uk/L8A5QV2mw.php
    • https://simba.simbapropertylistingsea.com/wp-content/themes/twentynineteen/sass/blocks/bVMQHi8npqSri.php
    • https://pccreed.com/n0fBZhgWWCcFo.php
    • https://loctraders.com/wp-includes/sodium_compat/src/Core/Base64/2qoGf0VX94dTFYv.php
    • https://fmpanamby.ga/wp-includes/sodium_compat/namespaced/Core/ChaCha20/mVjwniGX.php
    • https://cuencadistributions.com/wp-content/plugins/mailchimp-for-wp/vendor/bin/ekcBKiRsNXoj.php
    • http://script.rentpayez.com/wwVbFeF1V2mFa.php
    • https://sanjoseroofing.org/old/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/aRC84WdkOv16GY.php
    • http://electrocardsystems.com/plugins/vmcustom/specification/specification/tmpl/R674L7LjbwF.php
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform