Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6545a8664842e576…

MALICIOUS

PDF

53.5 KB Created: 2020-09-10 11:31:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: cbdab6f96ca93f6bae0bfc62479240ab SHA-1: cfe9d5b71a44d7470c30b06aa7866feec854ba9e SHA-256: 6545a8664842e57641f61f666ac024dc91dc261bbbb23d97eb4839eebb809411
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with the primary one redirecting to a malicious URL disguised as a job call letter. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' confirms the malicious nature of the redirector infrastructure. Additionally, the 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' heuristic indicates a large number of external PDF links, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or improve SEO for malicious sites. No scripts were extracted, but the document body and heuristics strongly suggest a phishing or scam attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=bin+sachivalay+clerk+call+letter+2019
    • http://files.grahamlloydmusic.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740538/341798c9.pdf
    • http://files.nailsatocean.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164414/jojowonigewi-jotepegufuwo-zobegan.pdf
    • http://nujewemur.section27alliance.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437423/c831b319652f61.pdf
    • http://vobikor.thelabclan.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131414661/lapedorupe.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • http://fedorahosted.org/lohit
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/32777b_afe9f61284f84c4cbdfa8c849bd4c71d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/956c05_de2f29acff7b48a7ad3c6316ead07f42.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0af078_53ff8475dedd49009a5139fa3c5220f4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f3bfbb_c144e0b8ab68488da64fd2098755510d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f390e7_7793e46688cc448ea5157cea90cec018.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7009/5521/files/xuseruranaxezovapurenuxow.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2378/5370/files/pejizakafofawisujatabo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/6296/5912/files/8016732828.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/87fdc7_39c1381a9b154b859b281df711cb9635.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e0c3c45da79249788ec0ee31b601bc21.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006bbb.bin
79a1cd935518851b7dd97c0607902cea322856b73aae9588839c7c1a45176050		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BBB 5324 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007dc9.bin
73eac943ed52933c63be52e7624447d54feb99d05f718907a5e3dbbcbc68e97a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DC9 10520 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a190.bin
cd94ef65598b1866d0653cdd88243d989fd81359c0e770c2d3a4858f1c2f6d34		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA190 4324 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000af91.bin
e237bf7db53bae636866027bef1cef6bdb467538a7959bb35939809f787bd5fa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAF91 7392 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.