Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 654393966ff2c352…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

66.5 KB Created: 2020-11-06 09:22:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 7fbbb25fbfc322167f51becfa7a130a2 SHA-1: 686fe050bbc5d01599d31d7bcd5335949fea7fb2 SHA-256: 654393966ff2c352c5b0a1286fa78c2a54410068ea1d7b1f60ab4924bfa5e36e
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is designed to execute a function named 'cute', which is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload. The document body's prompt to 'enable content' is a common social engineering tactic to bypass macro security.

Heuristics 6

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4af822abcf302d5515455b10a072a8b1c8461e37b30de88d0546de5d7c0f9359		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4492 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
1e4d3325d7f39182eecf0944ce5d7f629bab7186a819f7d95a2e683374214a36		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17920 bytes

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