Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6513f4e6c035cc3e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.4 KB Created: 2020-06-11 23:04:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 439618c1cec171a936cdb9eb040211e5 SHA-1: 62350f6b1367b6205ce8d836d8166bc38597296e SHA-256: 6513f4e6c035cc3eacbd363df8be96f7fc5d3b6091bcee5f10ad725436276228
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to other PDF files hosted on suspicious domains. This behavior is indicative of a link farm or a method to distribute malicious content indirectly. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content, possibly for SEO poisoning or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://andiamowithamy.voyagerwebsites.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131411411/131411411.html#ecg+during+exercise
    • http://saltgcu.club/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969910/kogukeli.pdf
    • http://mail.zakisaati.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969920/50c2dadb2.pdf
    • http://1d7.undesirable.us/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639655/6f660825a474.pdf
    • http://lovelivingnaturally.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383510/68c05c51.pdf
    • http://smokepublishing.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620685/3a02259f7193dba.pdf
    • http://cpanel.ashleymartinportfolio.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621720/vizakitukanolo.pdf
    • http://bullsnips.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289291/502781.pdf
    • http://hotchiwitchi.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856108/bopako.pdf
    • http://coup-de-coeur-garanti.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588203/f08407bc38e.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://mawefewo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nized.pdf
    • https://naxopovo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/52349348418.pdf
    • https://misawizotepu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/70600243259.pdf
    • https://detomanuz.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fexapesorazibosuvu.pdf
    • https://gubobag.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xadeb.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006a52.bin
e40f465010b34bf45b2c827d2db47e1b03df69e82ab221036eda345170ce08db		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6A52 10688 bytes

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