MALICIOUS
478
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the Shell.Application COM object to execute mshta.exe. Mshta then runs a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a second-stage payload from the URL 'https://potalgonabunbunsed.blogspot.com/compac.pdf'. The document also contains a lure URL 'https://account.bo0king.co/#invoice-1637482117.pdf' which is likely part of the phishing pretext.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998
Heuristics 14
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/Launch action target: mshta critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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/Launch action targets mshta.exe (LOLBIN) critical PDF_LAUNCH_MSHTAPDF contains a /Launch action whose /F parameter names mshta — Microsoft's legacy HTML Application host, used as a LOLBIN to run inline JScript/VBScript from a /P parameter (typically a `javascript:` URL). MITRE ATT&CK T1218.005.
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/Launch /P parameter is a javascript: URL critical PDF_LAUNCH_JS_PROTOCOLPDF /Launch action passes a `javascript:` URL as the /P parameter — mshta interprets this as JScript when used as the launched handler, giving inline script execution without a separate payload file. MITRE ATT&CK T1218.005 + T1059.005.
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PowerShell download cradle in PDF action body critical PDF_PS_DOWNLOAD_CRADLEPDF contains a PowerShell download-and-execute cradle (IEX/Invoke-Expression of a remote payload, [Net.WebClient]/[Net.ServicePointManager], or `-ep Bypass -enc <base64>`). These strings are rare in benign PDFs and are strong evidence of payload staging in an attack chain (MITRE T1059.001 + T1105).
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Shell.Application.ShellExecute COM pivot critical PDF_SHELL_APPLICATION_PIVOTPDF contains a Shell.Application object instantiation followed by a ShellExecute call — an evasion technique that can spawn the next-stage process via COM rather than the PDF /Launch action, sidestepping the reader's /Launch confirmation prompt. Often paired with mshta and a `javascript:` URL.
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Launch action high PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action with an unresolved or extension-less target — treat as potentially dangerous
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Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
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Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LUREPDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 52 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
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Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Additional-actions dictionary low PDF_AAPDF defines /AA (Additional Actions) that references an executable action (JS/JavaScript/Launch/SubmitForm) — can auto-trigger on document or widget events. Form-field calc/format/validate/keystroke handlers in legitimate interactive forms commonly fire this, so it is reported as a low-weight signal; weaponised auto-execution is flagged by stronger rules (PDF_OPENACTION, encrypted-with-JS, etc.)
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://account.bo0king.co/#invoice-1637482117.pdf
- https://www.dynaforms.com
- https://potalgonabunbunsed.blogspot.com/compac.pdf
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0005_000.js578fc8de6e928a575e0bbea33f45500a773ce9654d4069132b7d7e759cc50c6b |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 5 at offset 0xB8 | 70 bytes |
embedded_pdf_script_0000ca11.bin482a92344f5789757d52c48670feedd75ce49536b37d822dcc4f05e843ce4e22 |
pdf-embedded-script | PDF decompressed stream script payload at offset 0xCA11 | 365 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
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