Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64f8738577bd09d1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.26 MB Authoring application: Riched20 6.3.9600 First seen: 2018-08-14
MD5: fe3c9884f147a14a9cf50763b422a73a SHA-1: 4cc93b15173981529d0c2c8dd1aafb8873029e90 SHA-256: 64f8738577bd09d107ad68e5351879d072ca083c35da64eddece1ad54b41a8df
560 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, most critically the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 via the Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened. The presence of embedded OLE objects and large hex-encoded data blocks further suggests the hiding of a malicious payload, likely a second-stage executable.

Heuristics 12

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Win.Packed.Razy-10019629-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Razy-10019629-0
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1308KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ef.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xEF 654028 bytes
SHA-256: 0527445510dd268c012b69971a6c8ee1c589e41a012e60bdce21cf604e4b4195
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Razy-10019629-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
objdata_01_off0013f6d6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13F6D6 3980 bytes
SHA-256: 8075d14f5710459d204df5d08f6fc72929b23d8ffed5a98f8a5c37d620170486
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c%tmp%\njn.exe &��D$,f-Q���%
objdata_02_off0014191c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14191C 3546 bytes
SHA-256: 5618d70fd6ff6139f55c4113739cb29b2154aa3c229d64b07e2b864141d10fb1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd.exe /c%tmp%\njn.exe A C