Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64f3a8aa7bf17672…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-11-01 11:18:54 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 3796271003fe64edb34baa07ec134ccd SHA-1: 068081e91d2aef4dfe20077038e9c806bbe2d049 SHA-256: 64f3a8aa7bf176728511a6dce5883428dcb0b7e67ace81919ff98f9f9740e529
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to suspicious or disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. While no scripts were extracted, the presence of numerous external links suggests an attempt to lure users to malicious content or to influence search engine results.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=news+channel+8+tampa+fl+anchors In PDF document text
    • https://mapipuluzobeb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398440/lativavutofotaz_kunes_suwivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386849/normal_5f8f65f163104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gavawujag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134370084/mewesif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366627/normal_5f89d7084b6da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vejuvofarazaxar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355137/fobulop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dajifavetesa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234726/6600047.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367019/normal_5f8743932cf5c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dowezepuxaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134463959/dc7ea5bdac269e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/ratefunerod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jovikuveditowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874612/9210765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xikewewojan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134095915/8354f87bcf0aaea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/5319/4152/files/solutions_elementary_teachers_book_1st_edition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0507/2509/3554/files/25211679163.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006172.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6172 5508 bytes
SHA-256: 5064e8050681dd4c554476f98a9f05e768ce5ce32540261bbe46683b1657e0dd
font_01_sfnt_off00007424.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7424 10612 bytes
SHA-256: 2486cff6e1b1b8a20c0fdbfec4ca7a598c6eb48a15d3db4c3237ff2b7ae0da55

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