Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64ee1147fde8553b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.4 KB Created: 2020-08-29 03:52:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f8937bbdac4f958209458b75bebf19a4 SHA-1: 8a274d3e3d643b1de65b378d4812879661ac04b7 SHA-256: 64ee1147fde8553b6641f2b8fe0cd6907db62997b9137a70d57a1b84766f5bfa
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a link farm hosted on Shopify, and one critical link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the URL to the malicious redirector, suggesting an attempt to disguise malicious activity as educational content. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic further indicates an intent to conceal a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wix?keyword=ejercicios+de+plano+cartesiano+para+secundaria
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3275/5875/files/how_to_make_a_into_a_book_format.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/17810153535.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3993/2064/files/goreripaj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8092/4840/files/croqueta_y_empanadilla_1.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2640/7843/files/lawojegovatesosu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2385/9873/files/iphone_app_cheat_sheet.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f7e58743c2014c5bae040b09d7186fc7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_67c5535f64cc4a94b305c7f231320b18.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_eb46ebd43cf34e299c0d1d239ec101c4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f0d1465147984e98a0fc0aa581cad539.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_efec9eb68e56477fb6a6a8eed6735244.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_c4a474de23234ad19ff6efe174bdf19a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_8e52b85748f1468db76280c43edec44d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e934b1eb7db94ee79e3b7e0d26bc9e27.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006306.bin
80d4fa43fb0117b6a52440b244a210d965d11b0ff168ffc01d2ecd0c83c1f3a7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6306 5100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000746d.bin
39c3032897689fe7040dcb967a2f888f0912163c61964076801abe2743917920
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x746D 11124 bytes