RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 64de6e61feaed9ea

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

804.8 KB

MD5: fab1a20c72843f12f7d8c7811a7aa4fc SHA-1: f2f83f2220a0486c12b22bd3c60309d7548c5f55 SHA-256: 64de6e61feaed9eab7d9d3892fc1602577a25988bb2983e41f3b99dd8296e30f

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to deliver a second-stage payload, indicated by the critical heuristic firings and the presence of a decoded OLE1 native payload. The file's structure and the nature of the exploit strongly suggest it was delivered as a malicious attachment.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001ce5.bin` `6ddb6cbb2a16d2ab31714b9030ad08479919ca7b219ba05f3be68e4a3bb14d88`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CE5	408294 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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