Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64dc7f0d6a1b56fe…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.0 KB Created: 2021-09-09 16:38:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 6f8bb02992f6b0e610e28bf9a14e6d0c SHA-1: 5f073dfb6e4704c5feebf63b54ff7c19faadd9a6 SHA-256: 64dc7f0d6a1b56fe7457b29c15e8f2f9cbff6ccd471546e0fce3b86570ab5fe1
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised or disposable domains, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution campaign. The heuristic 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' indicates the document may instruct the user to copy/paste content into a command-line interface, a common tactic for executing malicious payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely involving the download and execution of a second-stage payload via embedded JavaScript or external URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9978

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=cwm+recovery+img+download PDF link annotation
    • https://happycondo.leaddeehub.com/userfiles/files/23228866156.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haki.vn/uploads/files/bemititiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.binghan.my/userfiles/file/33735434150.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://reparation-mobile.net/userfiles/file/71697465632.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://easternresources.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/58041823967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://solee.cn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/matopana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totoquynhhuong.com/upload/files/wuroluvavuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ipssecurityconsultants.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/rowulerutewid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ifacemount.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v122h0nc7fh7j6uua1t943u1pm/peteg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuacuonnhanh.vn/Images_upload/files/21727208574.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.paparazzirestaurant.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4eacdc48ce584802533b6696f2c378c5/ximaxexi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://articolo17.it/siti/usr/foto/files/raxitakafasokuxerenovifis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.iieng.org/editor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/woziselef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.onekaddy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16138b82d25a66---xukosukuzovulegat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://photopuzzle.net/userData/board/file/putolowexigov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arerp.kr/data/file///30284434484.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bagpack.com.np/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161367557bccc7---migepeminoweresurolakefe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://huuphongplastic.vn/uploads/images/files/gitodegupidijapovivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn----7sbezcba9a5aggb3j.xn--p1ai/ckfinder/userfiles/files/97023635712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://toyotaautobody.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/98023931268.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dimensioninteractive.com/WYSIWYGImage/file/rejitesoxorugagogos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://52fantasies.com/home/holly/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/12808286571.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pragatitic.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/18699333826.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d015.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD015 17768 bytes
SHA-256: 690f18b3f82e9c659ef1d61f035affa690985f587f102f666eb676a200e90820
font_01_sfnt_off0000fdfe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFDFE 10744 bytes
SHA-256: 369877ab5773fed000fa2246a4fd785e06f586fb0f6a611df5117aba08def499
font_02_sfnt_off00011678.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11678 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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