IcedID — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64d30e1e1045a962…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

34.1 KB Created: 2021-11-10 09:34:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 097e9ec5ba2d1e66280f60bc3777115d SHA-1: d9677f1ba65c0a5bac567fd78863762703ca0f53 SHA-256: 64d30e1e1045a9622d2bb5fda5165a4e091122a2482464f2addd8a70b7e2fcb2
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The `document_open` macro triggers the `main.karoline` subroutine, which in turn calls `ThisDocument.keywords` to retrieve a value and then uses `WScript.Shell.exec` to execute a command. The `keywords` function reverses a string, and the `s` function executes `c:\windows\explorer ` followed by the reversed string, indicating a downloader or execution of a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID' strongly suggests the IcedID family.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
9538377ab70fafe8faeadb4921724641afff84d2c219432ce704cb5fe2610b4b		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 966 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
caa335e53678e2de46df942bc2e52a290b7d5d47382e2ec08d0562a82bbbd60a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes

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