Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64cc58e270f7c264…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.1 KB Created: 2021-02-16 13:29:08 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-30
MD5: 976e8ea517d5ed9a82b24fc8cf1819b9 SHA-1: c39eec9c17bfc24aea3d5cb8edafde2e8dbac1f1 SHA-256: 64cc58e270f7c264fbc612cd305f2b9d55bba00a0b9f4af756a0bcf381fde5aa
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF file flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including a critical finding for linking to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The embedded URLs and the PDF structure suggest an attempt to redirect users to external sites, likely for phishing or to download further malicious content. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous links points to a phishing or link-farming attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=movie+memes+2020 In PDF document text
    • https://zaketedojerobi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136023974/gotolavu-bitifinud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fabikaj.iblogger.org/7737943239.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://blockhcain.host/mercedes_glc_coupe_250_performanceaou6s.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/suwajipufo/ihhhnij/pamizupafotigepuxitawuvax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dixozetazexode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472526/pamebop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xivovido/ijadigP/pubowebegojovagavelunum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lekorasosin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134612915/3938374.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://crubr.space/bluetooth_software_for_pc_softonicpoqde.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wejnpowk.space/walmart_platform_bed_frame_queen4t0n4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://belonimilulufaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134403367/rezoxit_warawiz_diwiraza_muxirokeval.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dujililapute.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347223/vavugawowofuzut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://specrazreshenie.com/misalufofabadokyh9bv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://fasilew.epizy.com/33199707308.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://waxusumuguk.epizy.com/hotel_reservation_form_php_code.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tamegebodow.epizy.com/jofajibidaxazufibavomise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xumizaxojumiko.epizy.com/broadcast_message_on_whatsapp_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eaab.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAAB 4432 bytes
SHA-256: 6dad659dbc3ac1cea735cf32c16e0ba3b8f2b14a3ec9e212948da8fedc2c8462
font_01_sfnt_off0000f9c6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9C6 10880 bytes
SHA-256: 7081bc67c60f6693b283ad850f40ee6c2153e1be30b4bd6900df63f80f245f03
font_02_sfnt_off00011dd0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11DD0 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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