Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64cb84d742303101…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.3 KB Created: 2020-07-10 20:13:06 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 51742ce0e399f6779c3bd2d889d2f7a9 SHA-1: f29279ae5ede959524351dacccd4de0c02777251 SHA-256: 64cb84d7423031014d335ca830420e23867e886a0aafca6a5176dba70d3158a5
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external PDF files hosted on various domains. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, and another flagged the document as a link farm. The embedded links likely serve to distribute further malicious content or manipulate search engine results.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=ind%20as%20revenue%20recognition%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.dragonflypaddleyoga.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813120/xodurebil_tagegonufede.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kathleenmercury.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969242/439069.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.smoochespooches.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070518/dixapavegip_susiribalalov_pudoforuladela.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.wendellmillspiano.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874501/biluwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hamptonplaceclt.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871494/860063.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.pureandsimplebible.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302919/sofomevi_supizanotuxil_wewonixoxamobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.artisticcheezwiz.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606281/lapamo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.northwoodssporttrailers.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776852/1363f4b4b1aa3e7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://dizujased.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bewekober.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fakuvinim168679484.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/15596781351.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kaluferono394203149.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mulibetupurikepovov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabaxopol.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/17467134092.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tudenobinedu359522656.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/natabiwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1560/2337/files/zodota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3213/3278/files/56680524763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/61066914906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/kepudanunakadop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/kozaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/42262915950.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006966.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6966 5172 bytes
SHA-256: b292ef2bf8760470030ab6742b0ce44f107eb2cd0651027b4cbf85b15a13af92
font_01_sfnt_off00007b0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B0A 9796 bytes
SHA-256: 6877faa08cbe715c6a5a56a3bdeb3aad3398607863ef975d8ce5400cc8cd946c

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