Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64ca19cc5dcb0e55…

MALICIOUS

RTF

45.3 KB First seen: 2023-07-26
MD5: e87279fec2b6dc8604bff1934336d6ed SHA-1: 9cfd9341bf50cd55c58749b3438431ff8cea27c4 SHA-256: 64ca19cc5dcb0e550f501b188a04ca6380816465870deaadb1d3c519aeba1d20
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination suggests the file is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000044b3.bin
1f6bf46ed2d0bff774b830aa33ed5618f2a508938b18d1a83e7003a3123f5827
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x44B3 2052 bytes