Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64a4c6d826cc8099…

MALICIOUS

PDF

126.0 KB Created: 2021-09-05 12:45:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: d8a543f32075b9d3732aec413edb1446 SHA-1: ce431c316e5a516c412b0c18043405b36d528917 SHA-256: 64a4c6d826cc80990da79cba6d6a369eb52670d73b7b7497f667c8dce16c89d6
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV. It employs social engineering tactics, specifically a browser extension installation lure and instructions to press Win+R or paste a command, which is consistent with ClickFix attacks designed to bypass macro restrictions. The presence of numerous links to potentially compromised CMS upload directories suggests a link farm used for hosting malicious content or redirecting users to phishing sites. No scripts were extracted, but the overall pattern indicates a likely attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9961

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://prsnashville.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7261f0e9edcd929e316455006b893818/mijuxiwakibusob.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://nobleanimalsanctuary.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tmp/takazumolugigev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarozlem.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8gukj910ngc51g68jbfdnlaau1/36043556610.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alpinedelhi.com/userfiles/files/30721499243.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.insurancedirectcanada.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a9cfd6c4f3e---8542583463.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cgeminfos.ma/upload/file/33364921281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://npi-management.org/ressource/site-image/files/20035459775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cal.lighting/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3c72fb1524cd560f3c500ea7febc13a2/suwezofopulamit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wacee.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b0bb22ce689---69497599182.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://humble-brag.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6tjuenr8v0rsvuhnm2na4gve7e/zupafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mesterek.net/tmp/8763333776.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://estigotours.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/10ee7557eeebe7754f9f3374996a3cf3/93938246653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stolizstekla.ru/userfiles/file/23795918106.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://oknoplus-omsk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/45bbced9b81e4377c0292d3778f4ff75/gijuvawaxonegoteba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://makingthegradetexas.com/clients/d/d4/d4716c73f098ea79da165a2194b6736a/File/68347797633.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cplastik.cz/data/cms/file/gexodipetafusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://swagath.co/new/ckfinder/userfiles/files/susizovanawagalumuxuzajof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://syuncyoku.jp/upload/file/61210065025.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cerrutistudio.eu/userfiles/files/50752702509.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://womenwhorockarkansas.com/clients/4/4c/4cfcdabbb7b8ad81bafe9a4295858145/File/ruzesedizenuwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abwcoliseum.com/uploads/files/vigubikatowabudata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jhannahs.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160795f7ea00c5---93118452738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sharzh-ufa.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d5719586a87db8c8da38b07a0eeffa52/wokogoboroporix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=normal+distribution+cheat+sheet+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00018620.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18620 11104 bytes
SHA-256: f791be2d88bcc0a99e87bff8d2b6b3f453a39bc73d7fdb91da4c1c483215f0a0
font_01_sfnt_off00019f8b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19F8B 19380 bytes
SHA-256: 6136294f8f24947108b175d2a38db03121192d27ffc666d43fefd2d3a3d1586a
font_02_sfnt_off0001d1b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1D1B6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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