Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 64a09ee4ab2e7f48…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: b6736cc6b68814ad912928bc768ea5d9 SHA-1: 489d8647798605b0fc55930eb6fd4f8f15d637fe SHA-256: 64a09ee4ab2e7f48196b9c17d51b483a504219234a0a72238d1f27b8f3e055da
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of the embedded OLE object, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability for client execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000095.bin
13382a4c4de807e6321c2e13866cd3d57c575edb9d68ae8ce9d0e62d3165ba11
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x95 2007 bytes