Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 647fba7e1d592eb2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.1 KB Created: 2020-07-09 03:13:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-25
MD5: 742c8b24d790b07f82501b714bb8e31b SHA-1: 44adb7e31dcbd9ff0147971b6ded313fa181aca2 SHA-256: 647fba7e1d592eb2316328463018cb104c9480b7c0729d456c8c4501ef051e94
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable domains and are likely part of a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to a resume and a URL that appears to be the primary lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=speech%20language%20pathologist%20resume%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.eugenemontgomery.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438766/zesolabugilobe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.biophysical-ecology.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406356/xivut_girusidusowele_finusagon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.light-sup.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681002/lolonegesositub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.pgrtoc.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775856/5787856.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.innerstateproductions.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607522/zasubeg-kawajusuzut-jileletel-zapavolokotexul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.gardenavenuepress.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740232/7557f3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.costigancustompainting.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872285/wizezizalo-dajobebew-kelos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.just-verandas.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379045/xobuxisedujus_wekabod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://miwexelak.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/26751875724.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kilabizusu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/14672699756.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nomezemo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/3837008484.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pulebikib.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/47865342824.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duzixegave.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kafen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kozaxijewob.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/wukamagejugol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/54440827626.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gowavofopinesifaremoka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/lufixupiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/10809735118.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/birizakidunupujudexi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/pafinekumukomotutawewokab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007fdb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7FDB 5556 bytes
SHA-256: fd7b8521d70b4326c45a90c5613f94782ebfe918f8c84a3949fb0051eb493fa8
font_01_sfnt_off00009288.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9288 10800 bytes
SHA-256: c3ed43b01a5475d7bff8937f035f45996dc1fe0e842bdc94196f3c47b2ac3d88