Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 647d2671db320110…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.17 MB
MD5: 9e598558ba90d0afbc5ce2286111be82 SHA-1: ded5f00bb6aa9be74b71854de5c2cb5d289081fe SHA-256: 647d2671db3201106df89364b97a5ece0ccd08ac2d6fbf62a718393c6a637c24
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. This exploit allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of multiple ".objdata" sections and the explicit mention of Equation Editor activation strongly indicate this exploit vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f58.bin
11837673ea5ae2420373211e05ae8b37707bcc1ba648df10bf998120b1efe169
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF58 52820 bytes
objdata_01_off0002e21f.bin
d58e45cc3a60ce012b53972ea70846c80b4219924e4d59541626e9dbb3083e1d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2E21F 254566 bytes