Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6475026a0bf7312f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.1 KB Created: 2021-01-27 17:21:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 38737dfbf5602de98bc0df17e9a264c8 SHA-1: 7e146b61b8c4ccea3bdde7cade392475d238aabe SHA-256: 6475026a0bf7312f68a7fa143fae80957e3e73ab39fcd092a595fa586fdd7511
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This macro utilizes CreateObject to download a file from a hardcoded URL and save it to disk, which is then likely executed. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12211-9918950-0' further supports its downloader functionality. The macro attempts to construct a URL using 'http' and a domain, and saves the payload to 'C:\users\Public\'.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12211-9918950-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12211-9918950-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5f926f19f0199968d3b3eac3625ff9383a8db1d587228d9f3d6ca1f0c7ae7def		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2271 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
ba6e2c8983500e00ddb8d06a7a04fb78ad616482a7f73dc955cf17fb42cd31e0		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 113664 bytes

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