Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 646804d53fe1c183…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

64.7 KB First seen: 2023-09-13
MD5: 3abad65647190c6c9c594eae83a64cf0 SHA-1: 8092b11f827508ba91fa38694b1047870e0194a7 SHA-256: 646804d53fe1c183c3887871d0edc480f435672f7bbff2e1e35be91845df5295
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates an exploit attempt via the Equation Editor. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic further supports the malicious intent by highlighting the user-enablement prompt.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002d38.bin
25073996da83dca370498d82d84e37df245b3b8bb5acdb456fb1bda5a7b25ba2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2D38 1982 bytes