Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 641ca7b7f7a08b5f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.6 KB Created: 2020-10-27 05:30:51 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: f86e2de32c8fca0348a5af2f26bb9af7 SHA-1: e2df0df942ef378f5c7446a457380ef685237029 SHA-256: 641ca7b7f7a08b5f19d3317950eebc680ac70592915ad4912d158d77427842c9
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious. The document body is heavily obfuscated and contains a URL that appears to be part of the link farm.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=what+is+kagan+strategies In PDF document text
    • https://vonegulozezuxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371031/0306b2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://netaluzubik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813777/tisoxoloragen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rikisuluwujufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452938/9433283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sipelebe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312525/ririfelenedipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389809/normal_5f92dd3a9500f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368485/normal_5f8b40210e89f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381997/normal_5f974ed981060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368492/normal_5f8a7a6aa9fe0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jiwepurojal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775762/7008435.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://koxarakofawel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310925/a201a116612f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/3250b5961ed1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wejibuxod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740202/xigafam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sedifuwenute.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134464273/6791536.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0503/3184/4771/files/tixaxizumutog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/2734/7109/files/navigateur_web_pour_android_tv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/1673/0277/files/formato_dc_3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/laradusa/clean_air_study.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zebarufuridorur/canada_student_visa_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vibuvomomuv/93053695788.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0266/9422/2000/files/24633117919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0495/6386/1148/files/famulalowet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000778f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x778F 4992 bytes
SHA-256: 3bc4ea6e8d8e1887e73ecc346ab40604f9a1a3a6b64e7a2d5f9ee7dfbebfb783
font_01_sfnt_off00008882.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8882 1800 bytes
SHA-256: a36eee06fef6ce219692c4ec918276ac99413e4fd1e3666e4031624f9289d620
font_02_sfnt_off0000910f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x910F 10644 bytes
SHA-256: 62296588f9e89ed4afefdfbf0dc315446efc50d379ef6684277ddc82902fe58e